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NOTES
ETHICS-A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL CONDEMNATION OF ATTOR
NEy-CLIENT LIFE STORY FEE AGREEMENTS-Maxwell v. Superior

Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Heated discussions among attorneys concerning the ethical im
plications of fee contracts which give attorneys exclusive rights· to a
criminal client's life story are probably rare. The average attorney
cannot afford to spend a great deal of time worrying about the ethi
cal dilemmas surrounding a situation with which he never expects to
be confronted. It is not, however, just the celebrated attorneys with
an eye toward writing books who should ponder the effects of this
extraordinary type of fee agreement. As the use of these contracts
whereby the client totally surrenders all rights to the story of the
crime and his trial-becomes more commonplace, the need for a
critical and ethical evaluation of this practice by the legal commu
nity also increases.
The recent case of Maxwell v. Superior Court,2 decided by the
Supreme Court of California, serves as a good backdrop for explor
ing the various concerns over these contracts. Maxwell is significant
for two reasons. First, the case highlights the variety of tensions
which life story contracts can inflict upon the attorney-client rela
tionship. All of these tensions are manifestations of the basic under
lying con1lict of interest inherent in these contracts. The attorney's
pecuniary self-interest in the publicity value of the trial is at odds
with his ethical obligations3 to plan his strategy and conduct his rep
resentation with independent, professional judgment, undivided loy
alty, and in the best interests of the client.
The second significant facet of Maxwell is that the particular
1. The contractual "rights" referred to include all variations of literary and dra
matic rights; i.e., reenactment of a crime by movie, book, article, radio or television pres
entation, or live entertainment.
2. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
3. See infrQ notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
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facts of this case ideally illustrate the far-reaching effects which such
contracts have even outside of the attorney-client relationship. A
more complex combination of issues resulted in Maxwell because it
involved a judge's pre-trial order disqualifying defense counsel on
the basis of a conflict of interest related to counsel's fee contract,
rather than the more common situation of a claim of conflict of in
terest arising at the stage of a post-conviction appeal. The pre-trial
status of events in Maxwell made consideration of two surfacing is
sues crucial: the role of the judiciary and a defendant's constitu
tional right to counsel of his choice.4
This case note stands in clear opposition to the Maxwell deci
sion. The court, in declaring this type of contract to be a permissible
means of retaining an attorney,S has knowingly encouraged unethi
cal behavior by attomeys.6 Not only is this a step backward from the
goal of strengthening the public's confidence in lawyers and the judi
cial process,' it is also a denial of an attorney's fiduciary obligations
to his client. 8 The damaging effects of these contracts far outweigh
the importance of a defendant's ability to retain counsel of his
choice.
Unfortunately, there is a very slim body of precedent regarding
4. Although the breadth of the sixth amendment right to counsel is an issue crucial
to the Maxwell decision, this casenote will not attempt an in-depth, separate analysis of
that constitutional right-nor the related issue of waiver. The note will deal with these
rights only to the extent necessary for comprehension of their effect upon the situation in
Maxwell. Instead, the analysis of Maxwell and relevant case law bas been limited to a
discussion of the interplay between the conflicting interests, ethical standards, and policy
considerations surrounding these contracts. For extensive discussions of the impact of
life story fee agreements upon the concepts of right to counsel and waiver, see Comment,
Conflicting Interests in Lawyer-Client Publication Rights Agreements-TIre Story ofBobby
Joe Maxwell, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 869 (1981); and Uelman, Conflicts and Criminal Mal
practice, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 504 (1979).
5. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
6. See id at 636,639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (Richardson J., dissenting).
The court's stamp of approval given to attorney-client life story fee agreements is even
more disconcerting when the possibility of their widespread use in California is consid
ered. Since it is the country's base for entertainment and media industries, that state
offers the greatest exploitation opportunities.
7. ''The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of jus
tice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount. . . . [The client's recognizably impor
tant right to counsel of his choice) must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which
run to the very integrity of the judicial process." Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568,
572 (2d Cir. 1975); see, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 268, 561 P.2d 1164,
1173, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 485 (1977) (quoting People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 185,524
P.2d 363, 367, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239 (1974».
8. See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 89-189 (1953); Kindregan, Conflict of In
terest and the Lawyer in Civil Practice, \0 VAL. U.L. REV. 423, 426 (1976) (discussions of
duties owed to a client based on the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship).
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the issue of judicial enforceability of these contracts. The courts are
currently struggling in attempts to balance the clashing interests.
There can be no compromise struck-the contract must either be ju
dicially recognized or invalidated. So far, the courts have uniformly
looked to ethical codes for guidance. 9 Some have been reluctant, as
was the Maxwell court, to rely on a code of ethics as the sole crite
rion for its decision. lo But other courts have refused to tum their
backs on flagrant breaches of professional ethics and have shown
their willingness to support the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility's explicit prohibition II of these contracts by judicially
declaring them invalid. 12
II.

ANALYSIS OF MAXWELL

The procedural facts of Maxwell are as follows. Bobby Joe
Maxwell, allegedly the "Skid Row Stabber,"I) was arrested on April
4, 1979 and charged with four counts of robbery and ten counts of
murder}4 Because several of the counts involved "special circum
stances," he faced a possible death sentence. IS At his arraignment,
Maxwell pleaded not gUilty and reserved the right to plead not guilty
by reason of insanity. 16 Although Maxwell was found indigent and
could have had court-appointed counsel, Maxwell instead retained
private counsel by means of a life story fee contract. 17 As payment
for representation, Maxwell irrevocably assigned to counsel all right,
title and interest to the. story of his entire life and the pending crimi
nal prosecution, including exclusive entertainment and commercial
exploitation rights}S
9. See Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 140, 158 (1981).
10. See infra note 52 and text accompanying notes 53-78.
II. See infra text accompanying note 167.
12. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 101-14.
13. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 7, col. 2. Maxwell was charged with the deaths of
ten skid row derelicts in Los Angeles between October 1978 and January 1979. Id
14. 30 Cal. 3d at 610, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
IS. Id
16. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
17. Id at 609-12,639 P.2d at 249-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178-80.
18. Id at 610, 639 P.2d at 250,180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The critical provisions of this
nineteen-page retainer agreement must be known in order to fully appreciate the ethical
dilemma created. Under the contract, Maxwell stood to receive 15% of the net proceeds
realized by any exploitation; the remaining 85% would go to his lawyers as their fee. Id
In return, Maxwell waived aU defamation and invasion of privacy claims which might
arise against counsel. Id As an extra precaution, the attorneys got Maxwell to agree to
waive his auorney-client privilege. Id n.1. It was contended by Maxwell's lawyers that
aU possible prejudice and conflicts of interest arising from the contract were cured by a
combination of the above-named waivers and the extensive disclosure made to Maxwell
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On April 26, 1979, defense counsel notified the trial court of the
existence of this fee arrangement.l 9 The judge then reviewed the
nineteen-page agreement and questioned Maxwell as to its contents
in order to ascertain his understanding of the conflicts of interest
present. 20 After finding that Maxwell did indeed knowingly and
willingly agree to the contract, and although counsel's competency
was not an issue, the trial judge nonetheless found the conflict intol
erable and ordered the pre-trial disqualification of Maxwell's coun
se1. 21 When substitute cQunsel was appointed over Maxwell's
protest, a mandate proceeding was brought in the court of appeals 22
to review the superior court's recusal order. 23 In denying a writ of
mandate, that court expressed wholehearted approval of the disqual
in paragraph 14 of the contract. In essence, paragraph 14 "declares that counsel may
wish to (I) create damaging publicity to enhance exploitation value, (2) avoid mental
defenses because, if successful, they might suggest [Maxwell's) incapacity to make the
contract, and (3) see him convicted and even sentenced to death for publicity value." Id
at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. Counsel attempted to de-emphasize these
bold admissions by closing the paragraph with a contradictory provision assuring Max
well that they would "raise every defense . . . warranted" and would act as "diligent,
conscientious advocate[s)." Id (emphasis added). It is also important to note, especially
in light of Maxwell's waiver of the attorney-client privilege, that counsel was not obli
gated, under this contract, to undertake an appeal or represent him at any stage subse
quent to the initial trial. Id at 6\0, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
19. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
20. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. The judge's inspection of
the contract and his questioning of Maxwell was appropriate because a judge has a strict
duty to ensure that every defendant truly comprehends the significance and effect of
waiving his constitutional right to conflict-free representation. Id at 620-21, 639 P.2d at
256-57, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86. Though Maxwell possessed only an eighth-grade edu
cation, he was literate and insisted that he was capable of a knowing and intelligent
waiver of those conflicts. Id at 611-12, 639 P.2d at 250-51,180 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80. A
different trial judge inquired into this contract, sua sponte, and again tested Maxwell's
comprehension on September 14, 1979. Id Maxwell reiterated his waiver as well as his
satisfaction with his present counsel. Id
21. Id at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. In ruling that the retainer
agreement created such a conflict of interest that Maxwell would be deprived of effective
assistance of counsel, the trial judge relied upon People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684,
145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). In Corona, a murder conviction was reversed because post
trial examination of a similar literary rights contract showed a conflict of interest which
resulted in ineffective representation. Id at 727, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 920. The basic conflict
of interest referred to is the same in all cases involving royalty contracts: the attorney's
pecuniary interest in a lengthy, sensational trial will necessarily taint his judgment as to
what trial tactics are in his client's best interests. See, e.g., id at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at
915; Maxwell, 30 Cal. 3d at 627-31, 639 P.2d at 261-63, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190-93 (Rich
ardson, J., dissenting).
22. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980),
vacated, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
23. A recusal order is one which disqualifies an attorney on the basis of interest or
prejudice.
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mcation. 24 Stressing that counsel had violated ethical standards in
creating the contract,2S and that maintaining the integrity of the judi
cial process was a concern paramount to a defendant's right to coun
sel of choice,26 the court of appeals urged judicial disapprovaP7 of
these "unconscionable and outrageous"28 contracts.
The Supreme Court of California disagreed and issued a writ
mandating that the trial judge's recusal order be overturned and that
Maxwell's original counsel be reinstated. 29 It was held that when
only a mere possibility of prejudice is created by a conflict of interest
and a defendant knowingly waives all consequences of the potential
conft.icts, pre-trial removal of counsel is not warranted. 30 The court's
insistence upon the need for actual prejudice and its deference to
Maxwell's waiver reveal the great significance which that court at
tached to a defendant's right to demand particular counsel, even po
tentially "deficient"3) counse1. 32 The court did not ignore, however,
the contrasting view "that life-story fee contracts are inherently prej
udicial, unethical, and against public policy. . . ."33 The very fact
24. Maxwell v Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849, 861
(1980).
25. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 853-55.
26. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 855-61. See supra text accompanying note 163 for
the wording of the relevant ethical standard applicable in Maxwell.
27. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856
(1980). "A conflict of interest which arises from the fee-interest potential of the retainer
agreement here is so inherently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of
the right to effective representation as a mailer of law." Id (emphasis added).
28. Id at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
29. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
30. Id at 610, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178. As support for this holding,
the majority relied on Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr.
I (1968), and Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal. 2d 832, 447 P.2d 650, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1968).
31. 30 Cal. 3d at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
32. "[T)he involuntary removal of an attorney is a severe limitation on a defend
ant's right to counsel and may be justified, if at aU, only in the most flagrant circum
stances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial controls have
failed." Id at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Cannon v. Commis
sion on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678,697,537 P.2d 898, 911, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778,
791 (1975».
33. Id at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182. The court examined a
number of decisions, including the following, in which this opposing view was found
persuasive and prevailed. Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.), cerro
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); Ray V. Rose, 535 F.2d 966, 974 (6th Cir.), cerro denied,429
U.S. 1026 (1976); United States V. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
vacated, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); People v. Co
rona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978). Ultimately, the Maxwell
court rejected the argument that preservation of "the integrity of a trial and thus, confi
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that the court did consider the many ethicaP4 and public policy3S
concerns involved, and yet was not convinced of their overriding im
portance, makes its cautious closing remark36 all the more contradic
tory to its holding. 31
Chief Justice Bird, concurring and dissenting, defended these
contracts on the additional ground that they might be the only
means by which an indigent defendant could ever secure counsel of
his choice. 38 He dissented from Maxwell's result, however, conclud
dence in the judicial process" were concerns that "outweigh a single defendant's interest
in chosen counsel." 30 Cal. 3d at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
34. 30 Cal. 3d at 616-17 nn.5-6, 639 P.2d at 253-54 nn.5-6, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 183
nn.5-6; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-4 & DR 5-103(A)
(1979); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(d) (Discussion Draft 1980)
(current version of MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(d) (1983»; CAL
IFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-101 (1975). For further discussion
of these rules, see supra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
35. A major public policy concern which was quickly dismissed by the majority is
the existence in many states of so-called "Son of Sam" statutes. These laws provide "that
any proceeds from commercial exploitation of one's crimes shall be paid into state-super
vised escrow funds for disbursement to victims and for legal defense. . . . A similar
proposal failed in the California Legislature." 30 Cal. 3d at 617 n.7, 639 P.2d at 254 n.7,
180 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1978); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-14-31 (1982); Criminal Victim's Escrow Account Act of 1979, §§ 1-10, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 401-410 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258A, § 8 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982). Such
statutes reveal the public's disdain for contracts involving exploitation rights to reenact a
crime, regardless of who the other contracting party is. But since these statutes require
only those proceeds which would otherwise go to the criminal under the contract to be
paid into the account, Maxwell's lawyer could retain his profits even if California had
chosen to adopt such legislation. Nonetheless, such statutes single these contracts out as
being against public policy because they allow the offender to monetarily profit from his
crime while his victims go uncompensated. It seems similarly inequitable to allow an
attorney to become unjustly enriched as a direct consequence of an atrociously violent
crime.
36. "We stress that our opinion connotes no moral or ethical approval of life-story
fee contracts." 30 Cal. 3d at 622,639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
37. The dissent was disturbed at the majority's attempt to deny its ethical and
moral approval of such cOntracts while at the same time allowing their existence regard
less of numerous unethical implications. "With due respect, it seems to me inescapable
that the majority does approve and sanction the agreement." Id at 636, 639 P.2d at 266,
180 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (Richardson, l., dissenting) (emphasis in original). lustice Kaus,
although concurring, was also disappointed and "had hoped that our opinion would find
harsher language respecting the 'life story' contract's propriety as well as its enforceabil
ity." Id at 622-23, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, l., concurring).
38. Id at 623-24, 639 P.2d at 258-59, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.l., concurring
and dissenting). This is indeed quite an elevation of the right to choose one's counsel.
Indigent criminal defendants are already guaranteed free court-appointed counsel. Ar
guably, such protection for indigents satisfies the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel if all lawyers are to be presumed competent. To say that an indi
gent defendant has a constitutional right to secure a more famous attorney not only
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ing that no adequate waiver was made by Maxwell. 39
Justice Richardson, however, wholly dissented. Focusing upon
the particular provisions of Maxwell's contract, its troubling fea
tures, and the numerous contlicts of interest created by it, he found
the contlicts to be irreconcilable.40 After exploring all pertinent ethi
cal guidelines41 in greater detail than did the majority, Justice Rich
ardson found these collective judgments extremely persuasive. 42 In
addition to the erosion of judicial integrity,43 he deplored two other
results of these contracts: the breach of an attorney's fiduciary obli
gations to his client,44 and the delay in the trial on the merits.4S In
response to the majority's jealous protection of a defendant's right to
choose his counsel, Justice Richardson pointed out that because
Maxwell faced the possibility of a death sentence, he especially re
quired "counsel whose allegiance to him is total and unalloyed, free
of the subtle, opposing magnetic pull of self-interest or adverse pecu
niary advantage. This, the majority refuses to assure."46
III.

RELEVANT CASE LAW

Case law in this area is limited because the use of a life story
contract by an attorney as a fee arrangement is an extraordinary and
makes the right to counsel of choice an absolute one, but also suggests that court-ap
pointed counsel would provide ineffective representation.
39. Id at 624-25, 639 P.2d at 259-60, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (Bird, c.J., concur
ring and dissenting). Chief Justice Bird asserted that the inadequacy flowed from several
facts: no layman could possibly understand the magnitude and ramifications of the con
flict; Maxwell was not specifically informed of his inability to raise consequences of the
waived conflicts of interest on appeal; and the impact of waiving the attorney-client privi
lege was not explained to Maxwell. Chief Justice Bird would have ordered an additional
hearing to advise Maxwell of this information and then see if he still preferred to make
the waivers. Id
40. Id at 626, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 631-~3, 639 P.2d at 263-64, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
42. Id at 633, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
43. Id at 631-32, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
44. Id at 632, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
45. Id at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
46. Id at 627, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190. This important point went
unaddressed by the majority. It is likely that most defendants who sell their life story
rights to attorneys are persons who have been charged with committing a crime so vio
lent as to bring them national notoriety. Therefore, the client-party to these contracts
will almost invariably face a harsh sentence if convicted. Protection of his constitutional
rights is crucial in such a situation and therefore a conflict of interest involving the law
yer's financial interests should not be tolerated. By analogy, it is for this very reason that
contingent fees are disallowed in criminal cases.
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fairly recent phenomenon.47 The result is that clearly defined legal
guidelines concerning such use have yet to be developed. Patterns,
however, have emerged from the various cases and courts.
Most courts analyze the contlict of interest created by these con
tracts in terms of the same test applied to confticts stemming from
multiple representation: 48 some proof of actual prejudice is re
quired. 49 The other pattern which has emerged is that nearly all of
the courts considered defense counsel's violation of or compliance
with ABA and other ethical standards as a factor. so Occasionally,
these ethical standards were regarded as outcome-determinative,S 1
but often were deemed only pertinent and not controlling of the con
flict of interest issue. s2 Notwithstanding these two patterns, the cases
reveal a definite lack of uniformity with regard to application of law,
analysis, and result.
A. Federal Cases
Most of the federal case law on the issue of conflicts of interest
stemming from attorney-client life story agreements developed out
of factual settings significantly different from that in Maxwell. Un
like the pre-trial situation of Maxwell, the contlict of interest issue in
these cases was not presented until the stage of a post-conviction ap
peal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. S ) Nonetheless, they
are important cases since the basic contlict involved is the same, and
the Maxwell court looked to these cases for guidance.
47. See Annot., supra note 9, for an overview of federal cases involving such roy
alty agreements.
48. See United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1978), oJrd,
638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981) (dicta that any difference
between a conflict of interest based on multiple representation and one based on an attor
ney's private financial interests is immaterial).
49. See, e.g., id; Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); Fullerv. Israel, 421 F. Supp. 582, 584 (E.D. Ill. 1976); Ray v.
Rose, 392 F. Supp. 601, 620 (W.O. Tenn. 1975), oJrd, 535 F.2d 966 (6th Cir.), cert. de
nied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976).
50. Annot., supra note 9, at 158. See generally Note, Conjfict o/Interests When
Allorneys AcqUire Rights to the Client's Lift Story, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 299, 306 (1981).
51. Annot., supra note 9, at 158; see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); Castillo v. Estelle,
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894
(1978).
52. Annot., supra note 9, at 158; see cases cited supra note 49.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 144-56 for a discussion of the significance of
this difference.
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Ray v. Rose 54 was an early case involving a lawyer's acquisition
of exploitation rights. The defendant, James Earl Ray, was con
victed of first-degree murder for the slaying of civil rights leader,
Martin Luther King, Jr.55 Ray had entered into a pre-trial contract
with his attorney which made the attorney Ray's exclusive agent for
purposes of publishing and filming his life story. 56 Further contracts
were then made with an established author for the publication of
both magazine articles and a book, with most proceeds to go to the
author and the attorney. 57 Ray was advised to plead guilty and did
so, but on appeal claimed that such plea was made involuntarily. 58
Ray's contention was that his attorney's conflicting financial interest
in the publication proceeds caused him to improperly advise Ray to
plead guilty.59
The Ray court applied a test enunciated in Beasley v. United
States 60 to Ray's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 61 That
test first requires that counsel perform as well as any lawyer "with
ordinary training and skill in the criminallaw."62 In denying Ray's
petition for relief, the court held that Ray had failed to establish that
his attorney's performance was not at least of this caliber. 63 It also
considered the strong possibility that the death penalty would have
been imposed had the case gone to trial. 64 The second half of the
test is that the lawyer "must conscientiously protect his client's inter
est, undefiected by confiicting considerations. "65 Interpreting this to
imply that confiicting .considerations must additionally be found to
result in actual prejudice, the Ray court found only potential con
54. 392 F. SUppa 601 (W.o. Tenn. 1975). affd. 535 F.2d 966 (6th Cu.). cerl. denied,
429 U.S. 1026 (1976).
55. Id at 603-04.
56. Id at 604.
57. Id at 604-05. Under the original contract, both Ray and his attorney were
each to receive 30% of the proceeds. In a second contract. Ray further agreed to give 40%
of his share to his attorney as additional payment of fees. This second contract was later
amended to requue instead a payment of $20.000 plus expenses. Id
58. Id at 603.
59. Id at 607. 618-20. The basis of this contention was that his attorney desired to
rush a guilty plea, thereby avoiding a lengthy trial, in order to meet a publication dead
line. Id
60. 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cu. 1974). The Beasley coun cited Glasser v. U.S., 315
U.S. 60 (1942), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). as authority for this
test. 491 F.2d at 696.
61. 392 F. Supp. at 617-18.
62. Id at 618.
63. Id
64. Id at 619.
65. Id at 618.
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flicts of interest arising from the contract.66
The Roy court also considered the contract in light of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility and conceded that Disciplinary
Rule 5-104(B)67 had been violated. 68 This factor alone, however, was
deemed insufficient to warrant a reversal. 69 Taking a "totality of the
circumstances" approach,70 the court even suggested that disclosure
within the contract of the attorney's adverse financial interests con
stituted a waiver by Ray of any conflicts. 7! Significantly, the court
also mentioned its reluctance to intrude upon the privacy of the at
torney-client relationship.72
The very same issue was brought to another federal court not
long after Roy was decided. The facts of Fuller v. Israef1 3 are quite
similar to those of Roy and, indeed, the analysis and result run par
allel. In Fuller, a defendant convicted of murder sought habeus
corpus relief alleging that counsel's financial interest in the defend
ant's unpublished writings and video tapes (relating to the murder
offense) created a conflict of interest which rendered his representa
tion ineffective. 74 In particular, the defendant claimed that his attor
ney encouraged a guilty plea in order to keep the unpublished
documents from becoming public records at atrial. 7S This court,
similar to Roy, held that although the contract giving the attorney
such financial interests had violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B),
such violation did not, in itself, justify a per se rule mandating rever
saP6 Rather, some actual prejudice must be shown, and "the exist
ence of the contract alone is insufficient to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel."77 Applying a test similar to the one enunci
ated in Beasley and Roy, the Fuller court also found counsel's per
formance to be within the acceptable range of competence. 78
In Wojtowicz v. United States,79 the defendant and his confeder
66. Id at 620.
67. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(8) (1981). For the
text of DR 5-I04(B). see infra text accompanying note 167.
68. 392 F. Supp. at 620.
69. Id
70. Id at 621.
71. Id at 619-20.
72. Id at 621.
73. 421 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Ill. 1976).
74. Id at 583.
75. Id
76. Id at 584-85.
77. Id
78. Id at 585·86.
79. 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.). cerl. denied. 431 U.S. 972 (1977).
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ates had held hostages in a New York bank after committing an
armed robbery.80 The police laid seige to the bank but then agreed
to transport the robbers to the airport where they were finally ar
rested. 81 Wojtowicz was later convicted of armed robbery.82 Woj
towicz's attorney was to be paid his fee and expenses from a fund
created by the sale of movie rights to the crime. 83 Counsel had par
ticipated in negotiating such sale. 84 In accord with both Ray and
Fuller, the Wojtowicz court denied the defendant's post-conviction
plea for relief. 8s In response to Wojtowicz's claim that counsel's
financial interest in the movie caused him to urge a guilty plea, the
court said, "[w]bile we do not regard the practice [of attorneys ac
quiring literary or dramatic rights] as worthy of emulation, we can
not say that it rendered counsel's representation constitutionally
defective."86
Another federal decision on point dealt with a crime that was
even more publicized than Dr. King's assassination: the Patty
Hearst case. In United States v. Hearst,87 the defendant appealed
her conviction for armed robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. She contended that her attorney, F. Lee Bailey, motivated
by his own interests in a contract to write a book concerning the trial,
put her on the stand in order to remove vast areas of her story from
the veil of the attorney-client privilege. 88 Hearst also alleged that
Bailey's advising her to take the stand was designed to draw further
attention to the trial. 89 This trial strategy was claimed to be a mani
festation of the contlict between Bailey's personal goals and the in
terests of his client.90
On appeal, the court denied Hearst's motion for an order vacat
ing her sentence.91 Admitting that Bailey's financial interests ren
80. Id at 787. The facts of this case have been made famous via the popular
movie "Dog Day Afternoon." Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id at 793.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id
87. 466 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978), "oeo/ed, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), eeTl.
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
88. Id at 1083. In Moxwell, counsel attempted to avoid this potential problem by
having Maxwell waive the attorney-C:lient privilege before the trial. See supra note 18.
This provision was stricken from the agreement following counsel's reinstatement.
89. 466 F. Supp. at 1083.
90. Id at 1082-83.
91. Id at 1088.
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dered his performance suspect, and even conceding that acquiring
literary rights was a practice deserving ofjudicial condemnation, the
court nonetheless followed the federal precedent of Ray, Fuller, and
Wojtowicz, and required a showing of actual prejudice to render the
representation constitutionally deficient. 92 The court discerned no
such prejudice from the record and viewed the putting of Hearst on
the stand as a reasonable tactic. 93
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit va
cated the district court opinion and remanded, holding that such a
denial of relief without a hearing was an error.94 The court further
ordered that the United States Supreme Court decision of Cuyler v.
Sullivan ,95 decided after the district court's denial, be applied on re
mand. 96 Although Cuyler involved a conflict of interest arising from
multiple representation, the Hearst court held that any difference
was immateria1. 97 The holding in Cuyler had required a convict
seeking a writ of habeus corpus to show an actual rather than merely
a potential conflict of interest. 98 This requirement, however, is not
the same as a showing of prejudice. 99 For example, in the face of
overwhelming evidence of guilt, it would be almost impossible to
show prejudice if the end result, a conviction, would most likely
have been the same without the conflict. Instead, all that Cuyler re
quires, according to the court of appeals in Hearst, is a showing that
the alleged potential conflict did ripen into an actual conflict as evi
denced by some adverse effect on the attorney's performance. loo
In drawing such a distinction between "condict" and
"prejudice,"lol the Hearst court was the first to deviate from the pat
tern of analysis which had emerged from Ray, Fuller, and Wojtow
92. Id at 1083.
93. Id
94. 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
95. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
96. 638 F.2d at 1193.
97. Id
98. 446 U.S. an50.
99. 638 F.2d at 1194.
100. Id Under such a test, an actual conflict could be established by proving that
the attorney's advice to plead guilty or to take the stand, or his withdrawal of a crucial
defense was motivated by his own financial interests rather than by what course of action
would be in the client's best interests. It would be unnecessary to prove that the attor
ney's action prejudiced the outcome of the case. See id.
101. This same distinction was drawn much earlier in Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the test of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether the
representation would have been more effective had it not been for the conflict of interest).
See also United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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iCZ. 102 Also, the court of appeals in Hearst was far more outraged by
the contract involved than were those previous courts. The Ninth
Circuit not only criticized Bailey's conduct as being violative of ethi
cal rules and unbecoming a member of the bar,103 but also en
couraged the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Bailey. 104

B. California Precedent
In addition to the federal cases, the Maxwell court examined its
own state law. A decision directly on point, and decided not long
before Maxwell, is People v. Corona. los Juan Corona was convicted
of twenty-five counts of first-degree murder for the killing of twenty
five migratory farmworkers. I06 The murders, all occurring between
February and May of 1971 and under bizarre circumstances, were
naturally the focus of national media attention. 107 Corona retained
a private, solo practitioner and contracted for his services by surren
dering exclusive literary and dramatic rights to his life story. lOS
Under this contract, Corona waived the attorney-client privilege and
was not entitled to any income derived from his attorney's exercise
of the relinquished rights. 109 The attorney hired a writer to sit at the
defense table throughout the trial, and a book was published just a
few months after completion of the trial. 110
102. Prior to Hearst, the federal courts occasionaIly departed from the requirement
of actual prejudice, but usua1ly only in situations where the conflict of interest was
ftagrant. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978); Castillo v. Estelle,
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974). InAllIQTez, the defendant's attorney had also represented
co-indictees who pleaded guilty and testified against the defendant. 580 F.2d at 1253-54.
In reversing the conviction, the court ruled that such conflict-laden representation was
invidious and not susceptible to fine gradations. It!. at 1256-57. Therefore, once an
actual conflict of interest is established, no showing of prejudice is necessary because the
representation is tantamount to a denial of counsel itself. It!. In CastUlo, the defendant's
attorney represented not only the defendant in a theft trial, but reprcscnted the theft
victim as well in a civil suit. 504 F.2d at 1244-45. It was held that such conflicting
loyalties were sufficient for a reversal without specific prejudice. It!. at 1245.
103. 638 f.2d at 1198. "Potential and actual conflicts of interest always bring dis
repute upon the bar, the court, and the law. They do so to an even greater degree when
the case is a cause celebre and the attorney has the reputation of being an outstanding
lawyer." It!.
104. It!. at 1199.
105. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
106. It!. at 693, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
107. It!.
108. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
109. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04. This contract is very similar to Maxwell's
except that Maxwell retained an interest in 15% of the profits.
110. It!. at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 904; see E. CRA Y, BURDEN OF PROOF, THE CASE
OF JUAN CORONA (1978).
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On a petition for habeas corpus, Corona alleged two separate
grounds for reversal. The first was ineffective assistance of counsel
due to counsel's prejudicial withdrawal of crucial defenses; the sec
ond was that the conflict of interest created by the contract rendered
the trial so inherently unfair as to justify a reversal per se. 111 Co
rona's conviction was reversed and proceedings remanded, based
upon a combination of both grounds. I 12
The court first declared that effectiveness of counsel included
not only professional competence but also undivided loyalty of serv
ices, undiminished by conflicting considerations. l13 The court then
held that the contract involved created a conflict of interest so inher
ently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of effec
tive representation as a mailer of law. 114
Although the court placed great emphasis on the question of
divided loyalties, I 15 the manner and quality of the legal representa
tion were also in issue. Due to the attorney's blatantly inadequate
trial performance, the court also stressed the fact that the conflict of
interest had resulted in actual prejudice to Corona. 116
This latter finding has caused some courts to give sole import to
Corona's language regarding prejudice and to then conclude that ac
tual prejudice is still required for a reversal. 117 A comprehensive
analysis of Corona, however, reveals that the court gave both argu
ments equal importance and so the existence of the contract alone
III. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 704-05, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
112. Id at 730, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 922. Corona's retrial came to a close in Septem
ber of 1982. Corona was again convicted of first-degree murder on all twenty-five
counts. This second trial lasted seven months and cost the taxpayers of California an
estimated $5 million. It was the most expensive trial for a single defendant in California
history. His first trial cost only $415,000. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at 16, col. I. In
light of the strong case against Corona, and thus the predictable outcome of a retrial, the
exorbitant cost of the retrial, and the waste of judicial time involved, it is hard to justify
allowance of life story agreements. Their effects are simply too costly.
113. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
114. Id (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); and CastiUo v. Estelle,
504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974» (emphasis added); see mpra notes 101-02 and accompany
ing text.
115. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 719-20, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915. "From that moment [of the
contract's inception) on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting inter
ests-he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his
client, the accused." Id
116. Id at 721-25,145 Cal. Rptr. at 915-19. Actual prejudice was evidenced by the
withdrawal of crucial defenses, counsel's failure to perform adequate investigation, coun
sel's trying the case to the press to inflame passions, and the empty, unfulfilled promises
of counsel's opening statement. Id
117. The Hearst court, for example. interpreted Corona in this manner. 466 F.
Supp. at 1083.
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would probably have been sufficient to require a reversal per se, re
gardless of whether or not actual prejudice had resulted.
The confusion as to the correct interpretation of Corona is best
illustrated by the conflicting decisions reached in Maxwell. The
court of appeals, in deciding Maxwell, chose to rely heavily on Co
rona's language concerning divided loyalties and affirmed the dis
qualification of Maxwell's counsel. I18 The Supreme Court of
California, on the other hand, stressed only Corona's discussion of
prejudice and reinstated a requirement of actual prejudice in Max
well. 1l9 The court chose not to read Corona as holding that life story
contracts constitute a per se denial of effective representation,
notwithstanding abundant language in Corona that would support
such a conclusion.
C.

Subsequent Applications of Maxwell

In holding a defendant's right to choose his own counsel to be of
sacred importance, even at the cost of likely harm to the client and
the judicial process, the Maxwell court has opened the door to dan
gerous extensions of this notion. Faced with the task of applying
Maxwell as precedent, a California court, in People v. McKenzie, 120
cited Maxwell for the proposition that a defendant's right to choose
his counsel is paramount even to effectiveness of representation. 121
Consequently, the McKenzie court held that an attorney's clearly in
competent representation and total dereliction of duty did not consti
tute per se reversible error, even though it was an ethical violation. 122
The defendant in McKenzie was charged with rape, robbery and as
sault with a deadly weapon. 123 Throughout the trial, the appointed
public defender did nothing more to participate than to sit mute at
the defense table. 124 This behavior was in reaction to the judge's
pre-trial denial of his request to withdraw from representation of the
defendant. 12s Because the defendant himself had not objected to the
representation and because the attorney's threat to remain mute at
trial constituted only a potential conflict of interest at the pre-trial
stage, the court applied Maxwell's logic and held paramount the de
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

101 Cal. App. 3d at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
30 Cal. 3d at 612-14, 639 P.2d at 251-52, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
130 Cal. App. 3d 73, 181 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
Id at -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
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fendant's right to choose his own counsel, however incompetent. 126
Appealing his conviction, the defendant claimed ineffective assist
ance of counsel. Though this certainly seems to be a valid claim, the
court, in applying Maxwell, refused to reverse on this ground. 127 In
stead, they looked to the record for actual prejudice, as suggested by
Maxwell, and found none. 128 As to the attorney's blatantly unethi
cal behavior, that matter was left to the hands of the State Bar. 129
The defendant had not received anything even close to the loyal,
competent representation required by ethical standards,130 nor did
he receive a judicial remedyl3l for that abrogation.
A federal court in Florida reached an opposite result, though, in
United States v. Hobson,132 when it chose an analysis similar to the
dissent's approach in Maxwell. The criminal defendant's attorney in
Hobson was disqualified for allegedly violating an ethical rule.133
The defendant was being prosecuted for drug trafficking and it was
alleged that his attorney had prior knowledge of the marijuana
smuggling scheme. l34 As in Maxwell, the defendant had attempted
to waive the ethical conflict and insisted upon retaining the counsel
of his choice. 13S The Hobson court, relying on the same strong pub
lic policy argument offered in Maxwell's dissent,I36 held that a de
fendant was not free to waive any ethical problems because the
public's perception of the attorney and the legal system was in
volved; vindication of the right to counsel of choice would create a
serious risk of undermining the public's confidence. 137 As to the ap
propriateness of immediate disqualification, the court added that
proof of actual wrongdoing was not needed; the mere likelihood of
public suspicion outweiged the interest of counsel's continued partic
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
Id
Id
130. Id -, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 501. "Here we do not seek to hide the fact that
defendant was actually demed by his own attorney effective assistance which could have
been rendered. . . ." Id
131. Id at -. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 502. "[T)he choice by defense counsel to deny his
client effective representation was not of the court's making. . . ." Id Obviously, the
court is not willing to enforce a lawyer's duties, and yet, the court is ignoring its own duty
to ensure the fairness of all judicial proceedings. See infra note 154.
132. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir.), cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 208 (1982).
133. Id at 826.
134. Id
135. Id at 829.
136. Id at 827-28. The Hobson majority did not, however, cite to Maxwell. The
Hobson dissent did.
137. Id; see also H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 120.
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ipation. 138 Judge Kravitch, dissenting in part, admonished that
"[d]isqualification of counsel in a criminal case on the 'appearance
of impropriety' should be a remedy sparingly used."139 He then
cited to Maxwell as a decision which held that erosion of public con
fidence in the judicial system could never transcend one's interest in
counsel of choice. 140
D. D!/ferent Posture of Maxwell
With the exception of Hobson, the federal and state cases dis
cussed have a significant common aspect which Maxwell does not
have: they all considered the confiict of interest issue at the post
conviction appellate stage of the proceedings. A case such as Max
well, involving the unusual posture of preventive disqualification in
anticipation of prejudice, cannot possibly be analyzed in terms of the
"actual prejudice" standard applied in post-conviction cases, even
though the underlying issue is indeed the same. Thus, the initial is
sue facing the Maxwell court was the proper role of the judiciary in a
pre-trial situation. First, does a judge have the discretion to balance
the interests of ensuring a fair trial and the probability of prejudice
against a defendant's right to waive confticts and retain particular
counsel?141 Second, is it within a judge's supervisory powers to dis
qualify an attorney for an ethical violation?142 Although the Max
well court answered both of these questions in the negative, it was
only able to do so after distinguishing a relevant California case,
Comden v. Superior Court, 143 which had previously answered these
questions in the affirmative.
While superficially distinguishing l44 Maxwell from Comden on
the facts, the Maxwell court hinted at its real reason for not follow
ing Comden: it believed that Comden was becoming weak law in
light of subsequent liberalizing of ethical standards by the State Bar
ofCalifornia. 14s Although a civil case, the issue in Comden was simi
lar to that in Maxwell.l 46 An attorney was disqualified because of a
138. 672 F.2d at 828.
139. Id at 831 (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id n.7.
141. 30 Cal. 3d at 612-17, 639 P.2d at 251-54, 180 Cal. Rptr. 180-83.
142. Id
143. 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
144. 30 Cal. 3d at 618, 639 P.2d at 255, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184. "None of those cases
compels or authorizes a dismissal (of the attorney) here." Id
145. 30 Cal. 3d at 619 n.9, 639 P.2d at 255 n.9, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85 n.9.
146. The distinguishing fact that Maxwell is a criminal case should not render
Comden useless as precedent. Comden's emphasis on maintaining uncompromised ethi
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potential conflict of interest: it was likely that a member of his firm
would be called as a witness in violation of a California ethical
rule. 147 Comden held that "[flailing voluntary withdrawal by trial
counsel in such situation a trial court is vested with broad discretion
to order withdrawal."148 Not only was a timely disqualification
within the court's power, such disqualification was necessary in or
der to both minimize the prejudice caused by delay,149 and "ensure
that the standards of ethics remain high."ISO But the Maxwell court
chose to ignore the explicit recognition in Comden that a judge has
discretion to perform a pre-trial balancing of interests which may
result in a disqualification of counsel.
The Maxwell court would probably disapprove, then, of a simi
lar recognition of these judicial powers in United States v. Dolan, lSI
a federal case decided post-Maxwell. The Dolan court went beyond
merely authorizing a judge's discretionary pre-trial balancing. De
fendant's retained attorney was disqualified for breaching an ethical
standard. Specifically, in representing multiple criminal defendants,
the attorney became unable to adequately represent the separate in
terests of each defendant once he put one defendant on the witness
stand. 1S2 This disqualification was upheld as a valid exercise of the
court's supervisory powers, notwithstanding the other defendant's at
tempted waiver of the conflict of interest. IS) The Dolan court ulti
mately held that when an attorney will be unable, in a judge's
opinion, to conform with the ABA Code of Professional Responsi
bility's requirement of adequately representing the interests of each
client, the judge should not be forced to tolerate an inadequate rep
resentation of that defendant. 1s4 Breaches of professional ethics in
cal standards of representation is all the more applicable when the affected client is an
indigent criminal defendant whose liberty and perhaps life are at stake.
147. 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at II.
148. Id at 915-16, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
149. Id at 913-14,576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
ISO. Id at 912,576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at II (quoting United States ex rei
Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating &: Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1976».
lSI. 570F.2d 1177 (3rdCir. 1978).
152. Id at 1178-79.
153. Id at 1182, 1184.
154. Id at 1184. Pre-trial disqualification of an attorney who has breached an
ethical obligation to his client seems to be wholly justified by Canon 1 of the ABA Code
of Judicial Conduct which states: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispen
sable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining,
and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integ
rity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon I (1972). In fact, every judge has a duty to "take or initiate appropriate
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vite disrespect for the integrity of the court. ISS Thus, Dolan can be
interpreted to call for a per se judicial rule of disqualification when
ever an attorney has clearly violated an ethical standard,ls6 without
the formality of a case-by-case balancing of interests.
IV.

PROPOSAL:

A

JUDICIALLy-ENFORCED PER"SE RULE

The proposal offered in this casenote is not as wide in scope as
those suggested by Dolan and other authorities which encourage ju
dicial enforcement of all ethical standards. This certainly would be
a heavy burden to place upon an already clogged judicial system.
Because this article is limited to an analysis of the conflicts of interest
inherent in life story agreements, the proposal offered is similarly
narrow: a per se rule of invalidating such contracts is justifiable and
should be applied by the courts on a uniform basis. Several reasons
supply the justification for strict judicial enforcement of such a rule.
These types of contracts can only vary in degrees as to their
unconscionability and inherent conflicts of interest. Every single
contract of this type creates at least potential conflicts that immedi
ately do harm to the public's image of the bar and the judiciary.
Thus, there is no need to impede judicial efficiency by compelling
the judge to inquire into the particular provisions of these contracts.
A case-by-case balancing of interests is unnecessary when the same
interests will conflict in every situation. Neither is it feasible to be
lieve that a judge is able to predict accurately, in the pre-trial stage,
the likelihood of a potential conflict ripening into actual harm to the
defendant. IS?
Further, this inability to predict accurately the probability of
such ripening does not justify a ''wait and see" approach. As
demonstrated in the case law discussed, when the conflict of interest
issue is not raised until a post-conviction appeal, the defendant then
has the burden of showing actual prejudice. This is extremely hard
to prove. First, a judge is naturally reluctant to give relief to an al
ready convicted criminal unless there is concrete proof of prejudice
disciplinary measures against a . . . lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may become aware." Id Canon 3(b)(3).
ISS. 570 F.ld at 1184.
156. See Geer, RepresentaJion ofMultiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts ofInterest
and the ProfeSSional ResponsiJJUitin ofthe Defense Allomey, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, ISO
51 (1977-1978) (similar advocation of disqualification of an attorney before a potential
conflict culminates in a clear impairment of his independent, professional judgment).
157. 30 Cal. 3d at 630, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
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from an actual conflict. Second, actual harm caused by divided loy
alties or reduced zeal is difficult to detect from a record, and so it is
more likely that a court will label most of the attorney's decisions as
"reasonable tactics." Also, if the state's evidence is overwhelming,
and thus the outcome of a retrial with different counsel would most
likely be another conviction, the judge might not grant a reversal
even if he discerns actual harm caused by the contract's existence.
Therefore, it would be an injustice to "play the odds" and conduct
the trial in the hopes that the conflicts will not actually prejudice the
client. Not only does the client stand to suffer irreparable harm from
such a gamble, but his right to effective assistance of counsel will
have been violated at the outset by the initial allowance of the con
flict-ridden representation.
Neither is it an appropriate argument that a lawyer should be
given the benefit of the doubt and that the public should faithfully
trust in his ability to maintain independent judgment and undivided
loyalty, even in the face of temptations to act in his own financial
interests. IS8 Lawyers are no less human than anyone else, and,
therefore, no less vulnerable to subtle temptation. As pointed out in
the Maxwell dissent, an opportunity for pecuniary advantage can
cause even an unconscious swaying of the lawyer's decisions.ls9
Therefore, the per se rule would not be a pessimistic or an over
inclusive one. Rather, the rule is a prophylactic one which seeks to
avoid prejudice to a client in a situation where such harm is ex
tremely likely to occur, even if the lawyer involved has honest inten
tions. l60 It is the nature of the contract itself which mandates a per
se rule prohibiting them, not the personal attributes of the particular
contracting lawyer.
Besides protecting the client from probable harm, a per se rule
would have other beneficial effects. Congestion of the courts would
be eased somewhat by the abolition of the need for judicial review of
these contracts at the pre-trial stage, and by a reduction in the
number of habeus corpus petitions alleging a conflict of interest.
Also, the rule would destroy a potential device for "built-in rever
sal." Although the Maxwell majority noted that a defendant who
waived all disclosed conflicts of interest would be unable to assert
158. See United States v. Hun, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (if attorney's pecuni
ary interests are solely speculative, we should presume the lawyer will subordinate his
interests).
159. 30 Cal. 3d at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
160. Id at 636, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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those con1licts on appeal,161 Justice Kaus, in his concurrence, dis
agreed and stated he had no doubt but that the defendant would
raise those very con1licts on appeal. 162
V.

A.

ETHICAL RULES VIOLATED BY MAXWELL'S LIFE STORY
AGREEMENT

California Rules ofProfessional Conduct

Because the California State Bar chose to draft its own code of
ethics rather than to simply adopt the ABA Model Code of Profes
sional Responsibility, Maxwell's lawyers were bound only by the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. In determining whether
the life story agreement involved in Maxwell violated that code, the
relevant rule to interpret is Rule 5-10 I which provides:
A member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transac
tion with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory,
security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless
(I) the transaction and terms in which the member of the State
Bar acquires the interest are lair and reasonable to the client and
are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in man
ner and terms which should have reasonably been understood by
the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek
the advice of independent counsel of the client's choice on the
.transaction, and (3) the client consents in writing thereto. 163

This rule is quite liberal and the Maxwell majority found no viola
tion. The dissent, however, argued that the terms of the contract
violated the "fair and reasonable" requirement. l64 But if the terms
of a life story agreement are truly fair to the client, and disclosure of,
and consent to conflicts are in writing, then presumably the creation
of such a contract by a California attorney is not an unethical or
prohibited practice.

B. ABA Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA
Code)16S has taken quite a different approach to life story fee agree
161. Id at 619 n.lI, 639 P.2d at 265 n.lI, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185 n.lI.
162. Id at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, J., concurring).
163. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-101 (1975) (empha
sis added).
164. 30 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) (compelled waiver of attomey-client privilege is both unfair and
unreasonable).
165. Since Maxwell, the ABA has officially adopted the Model Rules of Profes
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ments. Aside from general cautions to avoid adverse interests (simi
lar to California's Rule 5-101),166 the ABA Code spec!ftcally
proscribes life story fee agreements in Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B),
which states:
Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his
employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or un
derstanding with a client or a prospective client by which he ac
quires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject
matter of his employment or proposed employment. 167
Clearly, Maxwell's contract would be a prohibited transaction
under this Disciplinary Rule (DR). Its mere creation would be a per
se ethical violation because the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Code
are mandatory in character. 168 Deviations from "shall not" proscrip
tions constitute misconduct. 169 Ethical Considerations (EC), how
ever, are merely aspirational in character and were designed to
provide guidelines to a lawyer. 170 They are also helpful in under
standing the rationale behind some of the Disciplinary Rules. For
example, EC 5-4 articulates the justification for the per se prohibi
tion of DR 5-104(B):
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is per
mitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publica
tion rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he
may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his
own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a crim
inal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion pic
ture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with
respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or uncon
sciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his
publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these
potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scru
pulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the mat
ter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment
has previously ended}7l
sional Conduct as proposed by the Kulak Commission. The proscription against these
agreements was retained. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g.• MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A). 
IOI(A). -105(A) (1981).
167. Id DR 5-104(A).
168. Id preamble and preliminary statement.
169. "A lawyer shall not: Violate a Disciplinary Rule." Id DR 1-102(A)(I).
170. Id preamble and preliminary statement.
171. Id EC 5-4; see also id EC 5-2.
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A life story agreement such as Maxwell's, in which the client
waives the attorney-client privilege, would give the lawyer the right
to reveal his client's secrets and confidences.172 Although the ABA
Code allows an attorney to reveal secrets and confidences with the
consent of his client after full disclosure,173 EC 4-1 suggests a loftier
standard of conduct: "Both the fiduciary relationship existing be
tween lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal sys
tem require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets
of one who has employed or sought to employ him."174 Addition
ally, EC 4-5 adds: "A lawyer should not use information acquired in
the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client. . . ."17S These guidelines provide further justification for the
ABA Code's condemnation of life story agreements.
Further, these contracts violate the ABA Code's requirement
that an attorney represent his client zealously.J76 DR 7-101(A)(3)
states: "Representing a Client Zealously. (A) A lawyer shall not in
tentionally: . . . (3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course
of the professional relationship. . . ."177 Divided loyalties and di
minished zeal are inevitable results of the contract's inherent
con1licts.
Because the integrity of the judicial process is directly impli
cated by the creation of life story agreements, the Ethical Considera
tions relating to Canon 9 of the ABA Code also provide support for
DR 5-104(B)'s explicit prohibition. EC 9-1 states: "A lawyer should
promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profes
sion."17s According to EC 9-6, this responsibility means that an at
torney owes a duty "to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the
legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of
his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only profes
sional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety." 179
C. ABA Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct

The drafters of the Model Rules chose to retain the prohibition
172. For definitions of "secrets" and "confidences", see id DR 4-101(A).
173. fd. DR 4-101(C)(I).
174. fd. EC 4-1.
175. fd. EC 4-5.
176. "This obligation, in its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process."
Thode, TIre Etlrical Standmd/or tire AdI'ocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 584 (1961).
177. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(3) (1981); see
also id. EC 7-1.
178. fd. EC 9-1.
179. fd. EC 9-6.
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against life story fee agreements in what is now the "new" ABA
Code. ISO An approach similar to that of the ABA Code was taken.
The Model Rules first provide a general rule concerning conflicts of
interest. lSI This rule allows continued representation if the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected
and the client consents. IS2
The Model Rules continue, however, to set apart life story
agreements as a distinct exception to the general rule. Rule 1.8, enti
tled "Conftict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions," provides in sub
section (d) that: "Prior to the conclusion of representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the
lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in
substantial part on information relating to the representation."ls3
The comment made by the drafters relating to this "shall not" provi
sion indicates their distaste for a practice which would be so poten
tially harmful to a client:
An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights

concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict be
tween the interests of the client and the personal interest of the
lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may
detract from the publication value of an account of the
representation. 184

It seems that the drafters' underlying concerns were with the element
of temptation and the need to assure the independence of a lawyer's
professional judgment. In a subsequent note to the rule, the drafters
made it clear that "[t]his Rule deals with certain transactions that per
se involve conftict of interest." ISS

D. ABA Standards Relating to the Administration
Justice: The Defense Function

of Criminal

The Defense Function sets out minimum standards of conduct
for defense attorneys. In addition to a general rule on conftict of
interest, there is a separate provision which expressly refers to the
issue at hand. Standard 4-3.4, entitled "Obtaining Publication
Rights from the Accused," states that:
180. The Model Rules, proposed by the Kutak Commission, were finally adopted
by the ABA on August 2, 1983.
181. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
182. Id
183. Id Rule 1.8(d).
184. Id Rule 1.8(d) comment.
185. Id Rule 1.8(d) note on code comparison.
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It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer, prior to conclusion of all
aspects of the matter giving rise to his or her employment, to enter
into any agreement or understanding with a client or a prospective
client by which the lawyer acquires an interest in publication
rights with respect to the subject matter of the employment or pro
posed employment. 186

It is quite clear that the ABA, if not the State Bar of California,
is genuinely concerned with the specific issue of an attorney's acqui
sition of literary rights. In declaring it to be a per se contlict of inter
est, and in treating this issue separately from other contlict of interest
situations, the ABA has taken a strong and decisive stand. It is now
up to the courts to give meaning to the ABA's action by enforcing at
least this one per se ethical prohibition. It does little good to revise
an outdated code of ethics if the new code will have no more of a
regulatory effect than the old. The legal profession has taken it upon
itself to regulate the conduct of its members. This is a laudable goal
but an empty one if lawyers continue to ignore the rules, hoping to
escape disciplinary action. The misconception of many is that the
rules of the profession state only ethical guidelines, not legal stan
dards. 187 The ABA Code was designed to be essentially regulatory
and mandatory in effect, but this legal function has been obscured by
the label "code of ethics."188 It has been promised that "the new
rules will comprise collectively the 'law of legal ethics.' "189
VI.

CONCLUSION

An attorney's pledge of undivided loyalty is immediately bro
ken at the creation of an attorney-client contract giving the attorney
exploitation rights to the client's life story. This pledge stems not
only from the attorney's fiduciary duties but from the Constitution as
well. l90 The Constitution's guarantee of effective assistance of coun
186. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL Jus
TICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-3.4 (1983).
187. Patterson,A Preliminary Rationalization of the Low of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C.L.
REv. 519, 521-23 (1979); see Comment, TIre Lowyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1335, 1335.
188. Comment, supra note 187, at 1357-58.
189. Id at 1335 (quoting Patterson, supra note 187, at 555). Patterson advocates
recognizing an attorney's duty of loyalty as a legal, rather than ethical, rule because, to
do otherwise, is to "vest in private lawyers. . . a vast amount of untutored discretion."
Patterson, supra note 187, at 554-55.
190. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It has long been settled
that such "assistance" must also be "effective."
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sel must be read to require undivided loyalty and devotion to the
client's interests. When the pledge of loyalty is broken by a conflict
of interest that was deliberately manufactured and has only financial
motives at its core, effective representation must be presumed an im
possibility. Such an open-ended invitation of prejudice defies both
ethical and constitutional standards. And if two constitutional rights
must clash, surely the right to "effectiveness" must be deemed more
crucial to ensuring fairness than the right to counsel of "choice."
For these reasons, a per se rule of judicial invalidation of these
contracts is a justifiable remedy. The stakes are simply too high to
engage in speculation as to the amount of actual harm likely to re
sult. The situation demands more than a middle-of-the road ap
proach. The ABA has done its part in seeking to curb a fast
growing, serious problem. It is now up to the courts to shoulder the
remaining responsibility; if not to help maintain the integrity of the
private bar, then to maintain the integrity of the judiciary.
Laura L. Higgins

